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ISSUE ALERT

pOCW^™u" ^ n issue raised in Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, #20246,
heard on the November 1987 calendar, and Lowe v. Sorenson Research
Co,, Inc., #20395, heard on the December 1987 calendar, has also
been raised in the following four cases all of which are scheduled
for hearing on the March, 1988 calendar, and in one case presently
scheduled for hearing sometime in early 1989:
C320

020682

Utah should reexamine its position on the common
law doctrine of employment at will, and adopt
exceptions to termination of employment at will,
especially if the employer has violated its own
policy handbook in terminating an employee, or
has otherwise terminated in bad faith. Good
faith and fair dealing are covenants implied in
all contracts. Larson v. Sysco.

020673

Berube v. Fashion Centre.

020590

Did trial court err in ruling that employment
at-will employees had right of action against
employer for breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Brehany v. Nordstrom.

020929

Was issue of wrongful discharge improperly
submitted to jury where Utah does not recognize
that claim in an employment-at-will contract.
Hodges v. Gibson Product.

870347

Was employee improperly terminated where
emploher had written job policy manual and
employee could be discharged only for "just
cause", or was employer alternatively estopped
from discharging employee based on employee's
detrimental reliance on that manual? Healey v.
D.F.G.Inc.
Was employer's retaliatory discharge of employee
who wrote letter to Industrial Commission in aid
of unemployed former co-worker exception to
employment at will doctrine, and subject to
recovery in tort, including punitive damages?
Healey v. D.F.G. Inc.

870347

Caldwell and Lowe, heard in November and December, 1987,
were both assigned to Justice Zimmerman.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTAH
CHARLOTTE HEALEY,

:
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:

vs.

:

DFG GOGGLES INC./ a
Utah Corporation/

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Priority Classification
No. (if. £
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:

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court
Davis County/ Judge Douglas Cornaby

I.

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF UTAH SUPREME COURT.
The statutory authority granting

Utah Supreme

Court

jurisdiction

is Utah Code Annotated

to the

Section 78-2-8

(3)(i) (1986).

II.

STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
This Appeal

Respondent

is from

a Summary

Judgment

granted

the

in the District Court of Davis County/ State of

Utah, on August 28/ 1987/ denying the

Plaintiff/Appellant's

claims of breach of contract and unlawful termination from
employment.
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
The Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1

a.

Did Appellant

state a claim upon which relief

could be granted, either in contract or in tort/ by alleging
she

had been

terminated

in violation

of express written

company policy?
b.

Did

the Appellant

state a claim

upon which

relief could be granted/ either in contract or in tort/ by
alleging that she was discharged in retaliation for a written
statement given to the Utah State Industrial Commission

in

support of a claim for unemployment compensation benefits by
a former employee

of the company

whom

the Appellant

had

supervised?
IV.

DETERMINATIVE
ORDINANCES.

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS/

STATUTES/

AND

Utah Code Annotated/ Section 35-1-16 (1)/ (4)/ (5)
Powers and duties of commission/fees.
Utah Code Annotated/ Section 35-4-2
Public policy - General welfare requires creation of
unemployment reserves - Employment offices.
Annot./ 60 A.L.R. 3d 226/ Section 3 (1974)
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Nature of the Case.

The Appellant claims exceptions

to the Utah "at-will" employment doctrine because of written
promises of job security from her employer

and because of

retaliation by her employer for a letter to the Utah State
Industrial Commission in support of a claim for unemployment
compensation by a co-worker.

The District Court refused to

recognize these exceptions and granted Summary Judgment.
2

These proceedings began when Plaintiff filed her Complaint in
Davis County District

against DFG, Inc. in October, 1985.

Defendant subsequently filed its answer and counterclaim and
discovery was conducted by both parties.
Defendant

filed a Motion for Summary

On June 23, 1987/

Judgment

Douglas L. Cornaby granted on August 7, 1987.
Summary

Judgment/

the Court

following depositions:

ordered

which

Judge

Prior to the

publication

of

the

E. William Scott/ President of DFG,

Inc.; Maria Gray, Assistant Manager/ DFG, Inc.; Reed Leavitt,
Plant

Manager, DFG,

Inc.;

Hai Holland, original

co-

Plaintiff/ whose claim was later settled; and Charlotte Ruth
Healey, Plaintiff (Volume I, January 10/ 1986/ and Volume II,
January 31, 1986).
C.

Relevant

Facts.

Charlotte Healey was fired

in

February 1985 from employment with the Defendant DFG Goggles,
Inc., where she had worked since May of 1977 (Deposition of
Charlotte Healey, Volume

I, pg . 3 ) .

The Defendant manu-

factures ski goggles and Charlotte worked as a supervisor in
the lens assembly process

(Deposition of William Scott, pg.

6, and Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume I, pg. 5-7).
When Mrs. Healey was hired, and other times thereafter,
she received a written three-page policy statement
in which DFG

set forth various

items of company

from DFG
policy.

Among the express provisions of the written policy statement,
the company

represented

that
3

after a short

probationary

period employees were given

"job security".

The written

statement further provided that job security could be lost in
three specific ways (none of which applied to Appellant) or
by "discharge for just cause".
addendum

Exhibit

(The statement is attached as

" A " ) . The officers of DFG viewed

this

written policy statement as binding both upon the company and
upon the employees.

(See deposition of company president/ E.

William Scott/ at pg. 34 - 37.)
Appellant alleged that:
1.

Her

discharge

was

without

just

cause and

therefore in violation of the express company written policy;
and
2.

Her

discharge

constituted

an

intentional

infliction of emotional distress/ and
3.

Her discharge was in retaliation for a written

statement she had sent to the Utah State Industrial Commission in support of the claim for unemployment compensation by
a former employee (Hai Holland) of DFG/ Inc. whom Mrs. Healey
had supervised.
Mrs. Healey filed a Complaint in the District Court for
Davis County alleging both breach of contract and actions in
tort

for wrongful

discharge

and

intentional infliction of

emotional distress.
The Honorable Douglas Cornaby granted Summary Judgment
in favor of DFG/ Inc. ruling
will" employee

that Mrs. Healey was an "at

who had presented no claim to an exception
4

from

the "at will" category which was recognized

courts of Utah.

in the

Plaintiff Healey appeals from that Summary

Judgment.

VI.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.
The Defendant employer gave express

written promises

of job security to the Plaintiff, and the employer considered
itself and all employees bound by such written

policies.

Plaintiff was an employee and could only be terminated with
"just cause".
manual are

The provisions of the written employee policy
specific enough to allow a cause of action for

breach of contract.

Consideration for the contract is found

in the Plaintiff's continued work for more than seven years
in return
vacation

for a package of benefits which
time,

promotions

and written

included

policies

pay,

of job

security.
"If -the

initial

contract cannot be found in a traditional

sense, the alleged

facts, if true, are appropriate

for an

application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel based on
the plaintiff's detrimental reliance on the written
manual.

The Plaintiff

alleges

that

she was

policy

terminated

because of a letter she sent to the Utah Industrial Commission

in

benefits.
retailory

aid

of

a fellow

employee

If true, these

facts

seeking

support

unemployment

a claim

for a

discharge which is a recognized exception to the

at-will employment doctrine.
5

The Plaintiff

also stated a

cause of action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress.

VII. ARGUMENT
In reviewing
evidence

a Summary

in a light

determine

that

most

favorable

1) no genuine

exists, and 2) the moving
Judgment
Co.,

Judgment/

83

to the Appellant

issues of a material

party was entitled

as a matter of law.

719 P.2d

the Court views the
to

fact

to Summary

Rose vs. Allied Development

(Utah 1986).

See also Bihlmaier vs.

Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Norton vs. Blackham, 669
P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); Bowen vs. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434
(Utah 1982).
Although

presented

with

factual

reasons for the Plaintiff's firing

issues regarding the

(i.e. "just cause"), the

lower Court concluded that Plaintiff presented no recognized
exception

to Utah's

"at will" employment

doctrine,

therefore had stated no recognized cause of action.

and

Appel-

lant argues that there was sufficient evidence concerning her
claims

for

intentional

breach

of contract,

infliction

wrongful

of emotional

submission of the claims to a jury.

6

dismissal, and

distress

to warrant

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL-EMPLOYMENT
RULE
Historical

development

of

the

at-wi11-employment

doctrine leads back to early British law.

During the 18th

Century when England was an agricultural society, a contract
for employment was presumed to be for one year

so that an

agricultural worker would not be out of a job when the season
ended.

When

Britain

suddenly

changed

to an

industrial

society due to the industrial revolution, the yearly hiring
presumption became less favored and unrealistic.

Employers

were in charge of a significantly higher number of employees
and could not reasonably guarantee
time.

them work

for a years

In response to the industrial needs, the courts, both

English and American, adopted the employment-at-will doctrine
on the premise

that an employer could quit the employment

relationship just as an employee could.
In Adair vs. United

states, 208 U.S. 161

(1908), the

court stated:
It cannot be, we repeat, that an employer is under
a legal obligation against his will to retain an
employe in his personal service any more than an
employee can be compelled, against his will, to
remain in the personal service of another. The
[employee] was at liberty to quit his service
without assigning any reason for his leaving. And
the defendant [employer] was at liberty, in his
discretion, to discharge [the employee] from
service without giving any reason for so doing.
Therefore, the Courts have, in the past, granted

employers

the right to discharge an employee for any reason, whether
good cause, no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, when
7

absent any time l i m i t

for the employment.

No exception was

recognized.
Recently,
inflexible

Courts

have

realized

the

imbalance

rule has placed on the labor s i t u a t i o n ,

interpreted

the

rule

in

Illinois

Supreme

Court

Harvester

co . , 421 N.E.

a less
in

stringent

Palmateer

2d 876

vs.

this

and have

manner.

The

International

( 1 1 1 . 1981) was one

such

j u r i s d i c t i o n where exceptions to the at-will-employment

rule

was carved out:
With the r i s e of l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s c o n d u c t i n g
s p e c i a l i z e d o p e r a t i o n s and employing r e l a t i v e l y
immobile workers who often have no other place to
market t h e i r s k i l l s , r e c o g n i t i o n that the employer
and employee do not stand on equal f o o t i n g i s
realistic.
In a d d i t i o n , unchecked employer power,
l i k e unchecked employee power, has been seen to
p r e s e n t a d i s t i n c t t h r e a t t o the p u b l i c p o l i c y
c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d and adopted by s o c i e t y as a
whole.
As a r e s u l t , i t i s now recognized t h a t a
p r o p e r b a l a n c e must be m a i n t a i n e d among t h e
e m p l o y e r ' s i n t e r e s t in o p e r a t i n g a b u s i n e s s
e f f i c i e n t l y and p r o f i t a b l y , the employee's i n t e r e s t
in earning a l i v e l i h o o d , and s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r e s t in
seeing i t s public p o l i c i e s carried out.
Wagenseller v s . S c o t t s d a l e Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025
(Arizona 1985) r e f e r s

t o a 1984 a r t i c l e

in 40 Bus Law 1,

which claims that "courts in t h r e e - f i f t h s

of the s t a t e s have

recognized

some form of

a cause

of

action

for

wrongful

discharge."
The trend has been to allow three general exceptions to
the employer favored r u l e .

These are 1) an implied

promise

Df permanent employment, 2) the public p o l i c y e x c e p t i o n , and
3) an implied covenant of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g .
8

>OINT ONE:

EXPRESS PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY WERE
MADE TO APPELLANT BY DEFENDANT

In analyzing whether promises were made by

employers

/hich would override their at-will prerogative, Courts have
Looked to the following: written or verbal assurances of job
security as long as the employee did a good job; (see Pugh
rs.

See's Candies, 116 Cal App.3d 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917

[1981); personnel policies explained in an employer handbook
>r manual, (see Toussaint vs. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
lichigan, 292 N.W. 2d 880 (Mich. 1980); promotions received
>y employee

(see Pugh, supra); and an employees longevity of

service (see Pugh, supra).
In this case, Plaintiff had received promotions (Deposi:ion of Charlotte Healey, Volume I, pg. 6 ) , had worked
:he Defendant

for 7 years, and had received

a personnel

nanual which gave a written assurance of job security.
written policy statement provided:
"You have a right to fair and respectful treatment"
paragraph 2, page 1.
"YOUR

GUARANTEE

OF

FAIR

TREATMENT.

Your

work

involves others. Sometimes you may have a problem,
suggestion or concern. You have a right to express
this and we want to hear about such matters."
paragraph 3, page 1.
"JOB SECURITY COMES WITH EXPERIENCE. New employees are probationary until they have worked 40
shifts... During this period, the employee can be
terminated for any reason that seems in the best
interest of the employee, others here, or the
Company. After 40 shifts have been worked you are
deemed experienced from the date of hire and have
job security.

9

for

The

Job security is lost when an employee resigns
(preferably after reasonable notice)/ when an
employee has been absent without notice for three
working days/ after overstaying a leave of absence
more than three days or after discharge for just
cause." paragraph 6 and 1, page 1. (See Addendum
Exhibit "A"/ for full text).
The language in the manual "deems" tenure and permanency
o be given once 40 shifts (usually 40 work days) are worked.
OINT TWO:

THE EMPLOYER CONSIDERED ITSELF AND
EMPLOYEES BOUND BY THE WRITTEN POLICIES.

The Appellant
greement

existed

in this case
between

the

alleges

that

f Charlotte

Healey

a binding

two parties wherein

*fendant gave written promises of job security.
VII/ Pg. 8 3 ) .

ALL

the

Deposition

This allegation

is

ipported by the statements of William Scott/ President

of

le Defendant corporation/

in his Deposition on pages 34 to

7 describing a three (3) page written statement of the cornany' s policies.

The statement was given to all employees

id the company admits they were bound by the policies stated
lerein.
In the Deposition of the President/ William Scott/ (pg.
• - 37) he was asked the following:
Q:

"Did

you consider employees

atements in that

to be bound by the

handout?

A:

What do you mean by bound?

Q:

Did you expect them

to live up to the rules and

gulations and statements supplied in that handout?
A:

Yes. I think so.
10

Q:

Did you consider the company to be bound by that

ndout?
A:

Yes."

These policies, the Appellant maintains, remove the case
om the "at-will" category of employment and impose special
ties on the employer.

The breach of these duties forms the

sis of Plaintifffs claims in tort and contract law.
INT THREE:

PLAINTIFF HAS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT.

The general

rule

previously

applied

to

employment

ntracts was that if a contract gave no specific duration
riod, the contract was terminable at the pleasure of either
rty and at any time.
P.2d

Dover Copper Mining Co. vs. Doenges,

288 (Ariz.1932);

2d 699

Daniel vs. Magma Copper co., 620

(Ariz. 1980); Crane Co. vs. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870

tah 1978); Bihlmaier vs. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).
Leikvold vs. Valley View Community Hospital, 688 P.2d 170
riz.

1984),

the Arizona Supreme Court

nnesota Supreme Court which stated:
provide

in their

employment

agreed

with

the

"if the parties choose

contract

of

indefinite

ration for provisions of job security, they should be able
do so."

Pine River State Bank vs. Mettille, 333 N.W. 2d

2 (Minn. 1983).
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

considered

a case

volving duties assumed in writing by an employer.

Other

urts have faced this issue.
11

has

See:

not

Mobile Coal Producing

Inc./ v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985) (each such case is
considered on its own merits and particular
See also:

Annot./

60 A.L.R. 3d

circumstances.)

226/ Section

3

(1974);

Wagenseller / supra; Broussard v. CACI/ Inc./ 780 F.2d 162
(1st Cir. 1986) (written

promise must be express not

im-

plied) ; Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co./ 102 Wash. 2d 219/
(1984) (employees 1

685 P.2d

1081/ 1087-88

expectation of

specific

treatment enforceable); Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche,

Inc./ 99 N.J. 284/ 481 A.2d 1257 (whether policy statement is
enforceable

is jury question

of intent); Langdon v. Saga

Corp./ 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
In deciding whether an employment contract is
"at-will"/ the court must look at the totality
of the circumstances surrounding employment
and the intent of the employer and employee.
Rose v. Allied Development Co./ 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986)
Appellant

believes that

statements which

implied

since Defendant made written

promises

of

job security,

Defendant should be held to such promises.
for

the Utah

Supreme Court

and

the

the

The issue is ripe

factual

synopsis

is

appropriate for such a ruling.
The obvious challenge to Plaintiff's claim of contract
is the issue of consideration.

As the Court said in Rose:

Was there consideration sufficient to prevent
Allied's termination of plaintiff's employment at
will?
This, of course/ must be consideration in
addition to the services already required and must
result in a detriment to the employee and a benefit
to the employer. ... Plaintiff contends that he
gave such consideration because he incurred
expenses for tuition and books/ thus suffering a
12

legal detriment* Despite this contention, however,
Allied correctly notes that it did not accrue any
benefit by plaintiff's attendance at school.
Allied concedes that had it requested plaintiff to
attend school or had plaintiff agreed to perform
services in addition to what he was already
required to do rather than merely continuing his
present duties, a different result might be reached
here.
To satisfy the "good consideration: exception of Bihlmaier, plaintiff would have had to
offer Allied, at Its request, something more than
what he was already obligated to do under his
employment agreement, not just a continuation of
the duties he was required to perform.
Rose v.
Allied, 719 P.2d 83, at pg. 86
The consideration

issue was historically an impediment

to claims of breached employment contracts.

Recent cases in

other jurisdictions have found that it is sufficient to show
consideration on the part of the employee simply by his or
her continuing to work in reliance on the employer's promise
of employment

tenure.

See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue

Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 408 Mich. 579 (1980); and Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
Courts have also found a breach of contract by addressing the consideration element in two ways:
1)

Traditional consideration
Early cases applied

a rule that additional con-

sideration, beyond performing the work for which an employee
is paid, was required to make a promise of tenure enforceable.

See Pugh, supra (discussing evolution of early cases).

The problem with this approach is discussed in Henry H.
Perritt's book:

Employee

Dismissal

follows:
13

Law and Practice, as

The doctrine of additional consideration sometimes
has lead to the erroneous notion that a promise of
employment tenure must be supported by its own
consideration/ separate from consideration for
other promises in the employment agreement.
A
majority view of contract doctrine is to the
contrary.
Perritt/ at pg. 139.
Perritt

also offers the following

discussion as

illustrative of the general rule of contracts:
'A single and undivided consideration may bargained
for and given as the agreed equivalent of one
promise or of two promises or of many promises.'
Thus there is no analytical reason why an employee's promise to render services over time, may
not support an employer's promise both to pay a
particular wage (for example) and to refrain from
arbitrary dismissal.
Pugh, supra at pg. 325-326 (quoting Corbin) See also:
Weiner v. McGraw Hill/ Inc./ 57 N.Y. 2d 458/ 448 N.E. 2d 441/
444

(1982);

Hamer v. Sidway/

124 N.Y. 538/ 27 N.E. 256

(1891); Restatement (Second) of Contracts/ Section 72.
The real issue in an employment contract is whether the
entire package of promises from the employer is supported by
consideration/

not whether every single promise

benefits/ working
plans/

conditions/

(e.g. pay/

vacation policies/

pension

promotions policies/ termination policies/ etc.) is

supported by a separate consideration.
In the real world of the work place/ an employee accepts
a job and continues to work/ continually re-evaluating his or
her commitment

to stay/ based on the entire package offered

by the employer and not on a sterilized
alone.

14

view of gross pay

The

Defendant

DFG offered

its employees

package of pay, benefits and protections.
(attached

as Addendum

employees and employer

Exhibit

a complete

The written policy

"A") was binding

on both

(Deposition of William Scott, at pg.

36 - 37) , and was relied upon by every employee who "could
read and understand." (Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume
II, page 33).

The Plaintiff, Charlotte Healey, viewed the

policy handout as a binding contract (Deposition of Charlotte
Healey, Volume II, page 83).
The Plaintiff's faithful work for more than seven years
was consideration for not only a unilateral offer of pay, but
also for the entire package of benefits of written promises
including vacations, promotions and job security.
In the most
security

was met

classic sense, the written promise of job
with

adequate

Plaintiff, Charlotte Healey.
v.

Ahmad,

668 P.2d

261

See:

consideration

from

the

Southwest Gas Corporation

(Nev. 1983)

(fact

that

employee

remained employed after receiving handbook containing promise
of employment tenure sufficient for consideration); Wooley v.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., supra (promise of dismissal for cause
only contained

in employee

reliance); Wagenseller, supra

handbook raises presumption of
(rejecting necessity of proof

of reliance in fact on policy manual promise); Brookshaw v.
South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W. 2d 33, 36 (Minn. App.
1986)

(employee

accepts offer

remaining on the job).
15

contained

in handbook

by

2)

Promissory Estoppel
Promissory

estoppel

on a promise

viewed as a substitute for consideration.

is

sometimes

However/ viewed/

promissory estoppel is just a term for the legal concept that
detrimental reliance on a promise/ even

if it is not bar-

gained for/ can make a promise enforceable.
ment second) of Contracts/ Section 90 (1979)/

See:

Restate-

including the

explanation in the notes to Section 90.
This issue is addressed separately as the next point of
argument.
POINT FOUR:

PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER FROM DEFENDANT UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

The doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applied for
recovery where no formal contract exists/ as discussed in the
Rose case:
Plaintiff contends that even if this Court finds
that even if this Court finds that there was not a
contract that was terminable only for cause/ the
doctrine of promissory estoppel should be invoked
to allow him to recover for his termination from
Allied. ...
To allow plaintiff to recover under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel would require more than his
subjective understanding that the two brief
conversations with Wetsel became a binding promise
not to terminate him.
It would further require
finding that he was justified in assuming/ once
again from these two conversations/ that Allied had
promised not to terminate him at will.
Rose v. Allied/ 719 P.2d 83/ at pg. 87.
The Plaintiff

in Rose

failed because his claims of a

promise implied from conversations with his employer were too

16

subjective, and because he lacked justification for reliance
on the conversations.
The Plaintiff, Charlotte Healey, presents a much more
substantial claim.
First/ the promises are written/ not oral, and express/
not implied.

The Court can analyze them and determine their

objective meaning/ and resort to speculation about intent is
unnecessary.

The clear objective

meaning of the written

promises requires just cause for termination.
Second/
tified.

reliance on these written

promises was jus-

The company President/ William Scott/

testified in

his deposition that the company and the employees were bound
by the written policies

(Deposition of William Scott at pg.

36 - 37/ quoted at POINT THREE/ supra).
have been given

The written policies

to new employees for years/ and they were

expected to follow them.

Reliance on these express written

promises/ was not only reasonable/ it was mandatory.
The Plaintiff/ Charlotte Healey; has alleged reliance on
the written job security promises.

She said that they were

relied upon by every employee

"could

who

read

and

under-

stand." (Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume 11/ page 33).
Charlotte

viewed

the written

policies

to be

a

binding

contract.

(Deposition of Charlotte, Volume 11/ Page 83).

If true/ these statements present a claim of promissory
estoppel as articulated by the court in Rose, quoted above.
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See also: Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp./ 404 P.2d 30,
17 Utah 29 32 (1965); 387 P.2d

1000, 15 Utah 2d 101 (1964)

(along Restatement of Contracts); Restatement

(Second) of

contracts Section 90.
The Plaintiff Charlotte Healey, presented evidence
which, when viewed in a light most favorable to her claim,
would

support an application of the doctrine of promissory

estoppel.

The issue should proceed to a trial of the facts.

POINT FIVE:

PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAVE BROAD INVESTIGATIVE
POWERS.

The Utah State Industrial Commission is given charge of
the administration of the Utah Employment Security Act. (Utah
Code Annotated Section 35-4-11).

Utah Code Annotated section

35-1-16 lists other duties of the Industrial Commission and
states in part that the Industrial Commission is to:
(1)

To supervise every employment and place of
employment and to administer and enforce all
laws for the protection of the life, health,
safety and welfare of employees.

(4)

To investigate, ascertain, and determine such
reasonable c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of p e r s o n s ,
employments and places of employment as shall
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this
title.

(5)

To promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation of disputes between
employers and employees.

Chapter 4 of Title 35 in Utah Code Annotated
Employment
tion.

is the

Security Act relating to unemployment compensa-

Utah Code Annotated section 35-4-2, states:
18

Public policy -General welfare requires creation of
unemployment reserves - Employment office.
As a guide to the interpretation and application of
this act/ the public policy of this state is
declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due
to unemployment is a serious menace to the health/
morals, and welfare of the people of this state.
Unemployment is therefore a subject of general
interest and concern which requires appropriate
action by the legislature to prevent its spread and
to lighten its burden which now so often falls with
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his
family.
The achievement of social security
requires protection against this greatest hazard of
our economic life. ...
To fulfill Plaintiff's statutory

purposes, the Industrial

Commission must have broad investigative powers.

If employ-

ees feared losing their jobs after complaining or providing
valued information to the Industrial Commission

regarding

their employers/ fewer employment disputes would arise to the
attention of the Commission and the system would be greatly
frustrated.

Who better than an employee can describe a

working environment?

The Industrial Commission's

hearing

process must be safely kept an open forum in order to secure
the welfare of the people of this state/ and to protect
"against

this greatest

unemployment hazards).
POINT SIX:

hazard of our economic life" (i.e.
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-4-2.

THE PLAINTIFF'S LETTER TO THE INDUSTRIAL
C O M M I S S I O N WAS A CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF'S
TERMINATION

Plaintiff alleges that the reason for her termination
was retaliation

for her submission

of

a letter

to

the

Division of Employment Security to aid a former employee of
19

Defendant

who

was

seeking

(Deposition of Charlotte
President

unemployment

Healey, Volume

compensation.

II, Pg. 28)

The

of DFG, Inc., William Scott, agreed with this in

his Deposition of January 8, 1986.

When asked"

"Did that

letter have anything to do with Charlotte's termination?", he
said "Yes".

(Pg. 31-32)

Plaintiff

had been

asked

by the former

employee

appear at the hearing regarding her unemployment;
Appellant

could

not agree

would lose her job.
72).

Industrial

however,

to this because she feared she

(See Deposition of Hai Holland, pg. 71-

The Plaintiff

former employee.

to

instead, wrote a letter

to help the

The letter which Appellant submitted to the

Commission

in defense of a co-worker was the

determining factor or "final straw" which lead to Appellant's
termination.

(Deposition of William Scott, pg. 32).

There

can be no other conclusion than the termination was based on
retaliation, but the matter should be decided in a trial of
the issues.
POINT SEVEN:

UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION TO THE "AT-WILL" EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
IN PLAINTIFF'S CASE

Plaintiff has presented substantial evidence
was fired
Commission.
exception

in retaliation

that she

for her letter to the Industrial

Utah Courts should recognize the public policy
to the

"at-will" employment

doctrine.

Courts, such as the Oregon Appeals Court stated:

20

Other

Termination for pursuing a statutory right directly
related to the individual's role as employee is an
exception to the at will doctrine,
Patton v. J.C. Penny Co. Inc., 707 P.2d 1256, 75 Or.
App. 638 (1985).

See also Cain v. Kansas Corp. Com'n., 673

P.2d 451, (Kan. 1983), allowing tort of retaliatory discharge
where termination violates public policy.
As discussed in the historical evolution context above,
when an employee's termination goes against a public policy,
the Courts have justification

for allowing an exception

to

the at-will employment doctrine.
One of the earliest cases making such an exception for
an offense to public policy was Petermann vs. International
Brotherhood
(1959).
for

of Teamster, 344 P.2d

In this case an employee refused to commit perjury

his employer

employee

25, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184

and

was subsequently

fired.

When

the

sued, the trial court ruled in favor of employer

under the at-will doctrine.

The Court of Appeals

reversed

and ruled that an employer's right to terminate is limited by
considerations of public good or public policy.

Many states

have faced this problem and most have held that an action is
available to an employee whose termination violates

public

policy and is deemed either a breach of contract or a tort.
(See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 515 (Ore. 1975) and Wagenseller,
supra).
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POINT EIGHT:

"JUST CAUSE" IS A FACTUAL ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED BY THE TRIER OF FACT

Whatever the reasons for the Plaintiff f s
Plaintiff

termination.

disputes that the Defendant had a just cause for

her termination.

Also, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

An employer does not have an absolute right to
discharge employees, and is limited by legislative
and judicial exceptions to the "at-will" doctrine.
Rose, supra.
The Washing Appeals Court stated:
A Contract for employment terminable at will may
nonetheless, be terminated only for just cause if
there is an implied agreement for permanent or
steady employment.
Goodpasture v. Pfizer, Inc., 665 P.2d 414, 35 Wash. App.
199 (1983).
The Defendant's exhaustive arguments in its Motion for
Summary Judgment

that

just cause existed

for

Appellant's

termination only illustrate the truth that "just cause" is a
factual

issue.

employment

See Harp v. Administrator, Bureau of Un-

Compensation, 230 N.E. 2d 376, 12 Ohio Misc. 34

(1967).
POINT NINE:

APPELLANT

STATED

A CLAIM

FOR

INTENTIONAL

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Plaintiff's Complaint

stated a cause of action for her

emotional distress arising from the intentional termination.
This allegation was based on Defendant's having provided all
employees with a personnel manual which gave written promises
of job security.

Appellant relied on these promises and was

subsequently fired contrary to the personnel manual.
22

Also,

retaliation

for Plaintiff's

letter to the Utah Industrial

Commission might give rise to the same cause of action.
Plaintiff alleges that her emotional distress following
her termination was so severe that she sought
physician.

help from a

(Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume II, Pg.

93)
In the Utah case of Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 11
Utah 2d 289 (1961), the elements of the tort of intentional
infliction
prima

of emotional

facie case of

distress were clearly defined.

intentional

distress is established when:

infliction

of

A

emotional

1) the Defendant's conduct is

outrageous, 2) it is intended to cause emotional distress, 3)
severe emotional distress results, and 4) a causal connection
exists between the Defendant's improper conduct

and

Plain-

tiff's distress.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant's conduct was outrageous
since the manual was distributed

to all employees

for the

purposes of defining "formal company policies" (Deposition of
William Scott, pg. 34), and when Plaintiff was fired without
just cause and

in retaliation for providing

information to

the Industrial Commission, such termination was inconsistent
with the formal company policies.

Plaintiff also claims that

Defendant's acts were committed with full knowledge and with
the intent of depriving Plaintiff of her employment
and to punish her for her "whistle-blowing."

security

Appellant does

not feel she was terminated for a just cause and has suffered
23

emotional distress and humiliation as a result of Defendant's
conduct.
The circumstances

surrounding

this issue are factual

questions which should have been decided by a jury.
POINT TEN:

WHILE APPELLANT MAY NOT RECOVER PUNITIVE
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, APPELLANT
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER SUCH DAMAGES IN
TORT

As previously cited in Cain v. Kansas Corp. Comfn., an
action in tort for retaliatory discharge may lie where the
termination violates public policy.

In the present case, the

actions of the Defendant in its breach of contract are also
the

same

acts

that

constitute

the

tort

of

retaliatory

discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Thus, while the Plaintiff may not recover for the emotional
or punitive damages under a contract theory, the

Plaintiff

may be allowed to recover punitive and emotional damages in
tort.

In a most

recent

statement,

Beck v. Farmers Ins.

Exchange, 701 P.2d 785 (Utah 1985), the Court refused to find
a tort of bad

faith breach of an insurance contract, in a

first part context, but noted that:
We recognize that in some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may also result in
breaches of duty that are independent of the
contract and may give rise to causes of action in
tort.
See also: Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Union America, 657 P.2d
743, 750 (1983).
The duties of the Defendant
assumed and relied upon.

D.F.G. were

voluntarily

The Appellant asserts that
24

these

duties may form the basis of an intentional tort action with
an award of punitive damages.
Punitive damages may also be awarded upon proof of an
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
"Vttt CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff has alleged the facts which/ if true,
would support a cause of action for breach of contract or for
the application

of

the doctrine of promissory

estoppel.

Plaintiff also presented facts which/ if true, would support
a separate action in tort including an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
awarded

Punitive damages may be

on the non-contractual claims if proven.

Utah law

does recognize exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine/
and

the case

determine

should

proceed

finally whether

to a trial

the Plaintiff

of

the facts to

can

sustain

her

burden of proof that she is not an "at-will" employee.
Appellant
be

reversed

respectfully prays that the Summary
and

this

Judicial District Court

case

remanded

back

Judgment

to the

Second

for a trial on the merits of the

case.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

/*

^

day of February,

1988.
HELGESEN & WATERFALL

JACK C.1 HEM5ESEN
Attorney fcjr Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the

foregoing

BRIEF OF APPELLANT,

to Erik

Strindberg,

Price, Yeates & Geldzahler, 175 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid this
bruary, 1988.
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day of Fe-

ADDENDUM
Exhibit "A" - Three page Policy Manual of Defendant DFG

About your work at D . F . G .

For

We at D . F . G . are glad to have you working with u s . People at D . F . G . make
a special ski and sport google which was designed by Bob Smith, called the
Smith Goggle. Our goggles are sold in a very competitive market to consumers
who carefully choose the product they prefer. The good design advantage is
lost If we do not put QUALITY In every p i e c e . You c^n take pride in your work
If it produces a top quality product.
You have a right to fair and respectful treatment. You a l s o have a r e s p o n s i b i l ity to give that same fairness and respect to everyone e l s e here and to do ypur
part to s e e that operations run smoothly and efficiently.
Your job will be satisfying to you if you bring a good and cheerful attitude to
work and encourage others to do the s a m e . Show your willingness to do your
full part. YOU benefit most if you try to Increase good will, good s p i r i t s ,
efficiency and self-development while on your job.

YOUR GUARANTEE OF FAIR TREATMENT
Your work involves o t h e r s . Sometimes you may have a problem, suggestion
or concern. You have a right to express this and we want to hear about such
matters. Please feel welcome to talk about It with anyone in management or
with Bob Smith. You are welcome to call us at home if it is important.

NO DISCRIMINATION
There should be no discrimination in any way prohibited by law against any
person b e c a u s e of r a c e , color, creed, s e x , national origin or a g e . Every
person here should have equal opportunity for employment, advancement or
a s s i g n m e n t , based upon merit.

JOB SECURITY COMES WITH EXPERIENCE
New employees are probationary until they have worked40 s h i f t s . The new
employee should use this time to be sure they fit the Job and the v*ork and
are compatible with others working at D . F . G . During this period, the employee can be terminated for a n y reason that seems in the b e s t interest of the
employee, others h e r e , or t h e Company. After 40 shifts have been worked
you are deemed experienced from the date of hire and have Job s e c u r i t y .
Job security is lost when an employee resigns (preferably after reasonable
notice), when an employee has been absent without notice for three working
d a y s , after overstaying a leave of a b s e n c e more than three days or after d i s charge for just c a u ^ e .

^ any c a s e where a layoff is required, or on call back after layoff, or lor
romotional opportunity, employees with the most experience in the c l a ^ i f i ation of work needed will be given preference provided skills and abilities
re relatively e q u a l . In any c a s e where skills or abilities are reasonably
uperior the superior skills shall be given preference.

WORK WEEK AND OVERTIME
/ork is usually scheduled Monday through Friday. When schedules are
hanged you should be given advance notice when this is possible bo you
/ill be able to plan your off-the-Job h o u r s . There is a 15 minute relief
eriod near the middle of each half shift and one half hour off work is s c h e uled for lunch.
)vertime pay of one and one half times the regular rate is paid tor all hours
worked in e x c e s s of 40 in our seven day payroll week which begins on Saturday
though no Saturday work is usually done) and ends on the following Friday
tight.

HOLIDAYS
\iter 40 shifts have been worked, employees are paid a day of pay for each
)f the following holidays when they occui or are observed on a woik day.
Christmas, New Year's Day, Memorial Day, 4th of July, j j i y 24th, Labor
Day and Thanksgiving Day. To be eligible tor such pay # the employee must
<vork the day scheduled for work before and after the holiday, or be expressly
Bxcused from such work by the management for good c a u s e .
Also, the day a f t e r Thanksgiving Day.
VACATIONS
After one full year of service has been completed an employee Is eligible for
one week of vacation time off with forty hours pay. After three year:, of servi c e , an employee is eligible for two weeks of vacation time off with eighty
hours pay. Pay for vacations shall be the regular rate paid, or the average of
piece rate earnings for the full month prior to the vacation. Time off for v a c a tions must be arranged in advance at times convenient for the employee and
the company.

MEDICAL INSURANCE
A medical hospital insurance program is offered to all employees. Benefits
can cover dependents a l s o . D . F . G , pays half the cost of this program for
any employee who wants the c o v e r a g e . Employees pay for any dependent
cove*age d e s i r e d .

DISCIPLINE SUSPENSION OR DISCHARGE
We hope there will be no need for d i s c i p l i n e , but extra protection is a s s u r e d
for you if you should be disciplined, discharged or suspended. It is as unpleasant to hand out discipline a s it is to be d i s c i p l i n e d . Self-discipline
avoids all these problems. Failing in that, other discipline can help us get
ourselves back on the right t r a c k .
Any d i s c i p l i n e , suspension or d i s m i s s a l is deemed final and accepted by all
concerned unless the person disciplined a s k s for a review of it within two
working days afterwards. Anyone making such a request will be given a full
hearlna with someone not involved in the d i s c i p l i n e . Anyone can ask and r e ceive ntup irom any other employee or supervisor with such hearing If needed.
Ii the employee is not satisfied with the decision after this hearing, the Company will have the matter reviewed by someone outside the Company who will
confirm it or recommend a different result.

SICK LEAVE PROTECTION
D . F . G . tries to protect some of your Income when you must be absent from
work b e c a u s e of illness or a c c i d e n t . We firmly believe that those who go to
the trouble and expense of coming to work should be paid more than anyone
not working.
Employees are credited with four (4) hours of pay protection after each full
month of service until a maximum of 96 hours of such protection has been
accumulated.
When required to be off work b e c a u s e of illness or injury an en ployee can
then receive five (5) hours pay from any such credits for each wor> d<jy such
a b s e n c e Is n e c e s s i t a t e d beginning with the first workday hospitalized or the
third workday of non-hospitalized a b s e n c e .
Any amount paid under Workmen's Compensation or other progtama will be
deducted from this pay for i l l n e s s or a c c i d e n t . Any accumulation of credit
will only be reduced by the amounts actually paid out to you and when you
return to work, you again begin to earn credits for this protection. Proof
that illness or accident n e c e s s i t a t e d a b s e n c e can be required and this can
include a statement from a doctor who treated or examined you. No payments
are made for any i l l n e s s during vacation, layoffs, or any other kind of a b sence.
FUNERAL LEAVE
You may have three days off work if n e c e s s a r y to attend the funeral or to
make funeral arrangements in the event of the death of a s p o u s e , child,
lM\\»- . ?.r*t>or (including steo-cMlri or r<*"*n\s). If sick loavo w ^ i-, !,,<>
available t h e s e may be used at the rate of 5 hours per dey lor funeral l e a v e .

